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Abstract
Most recommender systems (RS) research as-
sumes that a user’s utility can be maximized
independently of the utility of the other agents
(e.g., other users, content providers). In realis-
tic settings, this is often not true—the dynamics
of an RS ecosystem couple the long-term util-
ity of all agents. In this work, we explore set-
tings in which content providers cannot remain
viable unless they receive a certain level of user
engagement. We formulate the recommendation
problem in this setting as one of equilibrium selec-
tion in the induced dynamical system, and show
that it can be solved as an optimal constrained
matching problem. Our model ensures the sys-
tem reaches an equilibrium with maximal social
welfare supported by a sufficiently diverse set
of viable providers. We demonstrate that even
in a simple, stylized dynamical RS model, the
standard myopic approach to recommendation—
always matching a user to the best provider—
performs poorly. We develop several scalable
techniques to solve the matching problem, and
also draw connections to various notions of user
regret and fairness, arguing that these outcomes
are fairer in a utilitarian sense.
1. Introduction
Investigations of various notions of fairness in machine
learning (ML) have shown that, without due care, applying
ML in many domains can result in biased outcomes that
disadvantage specific individuals or groups (Dwork et al.,
2012; Barocas & Selbst, 2016). Content recommender sys-
tems (RSs), which match users to content (e.g., news, music,
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video), typically rely on ML to predict a user’s interests to
recommend “good” content (Konstan et al., 1997; Jacobson
et al., 2016; Covington et al., 2016). Since these predictions
are learned from past behavior, many issues of ML fairness
arise in RS settings (Beutel et al., 2019).
One aspect of “fairness” that has received little attention
emerges when one considers the dynamics of the RS ecosys-
tem. Both users and content providers have particular incen-
tives for engaging with an RS platform—incentives which
interact, via the RS matching policy, to couple the long-
term utility of agents on both sides of this content “market-
place.” Some work has looked at the impact of RS policies
on provider welfare (Singh & Joachims, 2018), on long-
term user and provider metrics (e.g., using RL (Chen et al.,
2018; Ie et al., 2019) or assessing various other phenomena
(Ribeiro et al., 2020; Celma, 2010)). However, little work
has looked at the interaction of the two on the ecosystem
dynamics induced by the RS policy (though there are some
exceptions, e.g., (Ben-Porat & Tennenholtz, 2018), which
are discussed below).
In this work, we focus on provider behavior using a stylized
model of a content RS ecosystem in which providers require
a certain degree of user engagement (e.g., views, time spent,
satisfaction) to remain viable. This required degree (or
“threshold”) of engagement reflects their incentives (social,
economic, or otherwise) to participate in the RS; and if
this threshold is not met, a provider will withdraw from the
platform (i.e., their content is no longer accessible). If this
occurs, user segments for whom that provider’s content is
ideal may be disadvantaged, leading such users to derive
less utility from the RS. This may often arise, say, for users
and providers of niche content.
Typical RS policies are myopic: given a user request or
query, it returns the provider that is (predicted to be) best-
aligned with that query. In our model, myopic policies often
drive the dynamical system to a poor equilibrium, with low
user social welfare and poor provider diversity. By contrast,
a more holistic approach to matching requests to providers
can derive much greater user welfare. We formulate pol-
icy optimization in our model as a constrained matching
problem, which optimizes for the socially optimal equilib-
rium of the ecosystem. We develop scalable techniques for
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computing these policies, and show empirically that they
produce much higher social welfare than myopic policies,
even in this relatively stylized model. Such policies also
lead to greater provider diversity—even though our objec-
tive only involves user utility—by (implicitly) “subsidizing”
some providers that would not remain viable under the my-
opic policy. We examine tradeoffs between user regret and
social welfare in this model, showing that user maximum
regret tends to be quite low, especially with utility functions
exhibiting diminishing returns. Finally, we draw connec-
tions to notions of ML fairness and argue that the outcomes
induced by our matching-based policies are fairer in a utili-
tarian sense.
2. Challenges for Myopic Content Matching
We first introduce an abstract, but general, formalization
of dynamic content RSs. Two key elements drive ecosys-
tem utility and dynamics. First, users derive (possibly non-
linear) utility from the collection or sequence of content
recommended to them, not just from the individual items.
Second, providers require minimum levels of user engage-
ment to remain viable, i.e., incentivized to engage with the
RS. Within this model, we show how myopic RS policies
often poorly serve both users and providers, and discuss
policy types that overcome this.
2.1. A Formalization of Dynamic Recommendations
We assume an RS (or platform) that matches users U to
content providers C. Users issue queries for desired con-
tent, drawn from some space Q. We assume U , C,Q are
finite. Given user u’s query qu, the RS returns a provider
c from which u derives immediate reward r(qu, c) reflect-
ing match quality. We often assume the existence of some
latent space X ⊆ Rd that is used to represent both content
and queries. This is common, say, in collaborative filtering
(CF), whereX is an embedding space constructed by matrix
factorization (Salakhutdinov & Mnih, 2007) or neural CF
(He et al., 2017; Beutel et al., 2018)). For c, qu ∈ X we let
r(qu, c) = q
T
u c be immediate reward.
User queries are received asynchronously and immediately
matched to a provider, giving a discrete-event dynamical
system over time periods 1, 2, . . . , t, . . . At each time t, a
user u[t], drawn from some distribution ρ(U), issues a query
qu[t] ∈ X , itself drawn from distribution Pu[t](X) reflect-
ing that user’s interests. The RS matches qu[t] to some
provider c[t] ∈ C, and u[t] derives reward r(qu[t], c[t]).1
We assume the RS has complete knowledge of the location
in X of c and qu, and that these embeddings do not change
1For ease of exposition, we do not distinguish the different
content items offered by provider c. Nothing fundamental changes
in our approach if we match queries to specific items if each item
is associated with a provider.
over time. While unrealistic in practice—most RSs con-
tinually update user and content representations, and may
engage in active exploration to help assess user interests—
the problems we address under this assumption are further
exacerbated by incomplete information. We discuss this
further below.
Let ht = ((u[i], qu[i], c[i]))i≤t be a length t history of
past queries and recommendations, H[t] be the set of all
such histories, and H[∗] = ∪t<∞H[t]. An RS policy
pi : H[∗]× (Q,U)→ ∆(C) maps a history and a query to
a distribution pi(ht, qu[t]) over providers.
Generally, an RS aims to maximize user engagement. We as-
sume that over long horizons, user engagement is optimized
by maximizing user utility, which in turn drives sustained
user satisfaction with the platform. We assume that u’s
utility is a (possibly non-linear) function f of the reward
sequence ru obtained over some horizon. For instance, this
might be the cumulative sum of rewards; recency-weighted
cumulative reward; or a function (e.g., sigmoid) that cap-
tures various behavioral phenomena, such as decreasing
marginal returns. We discuss several such functions in
Sec. 3. However, even with this user focus, the RS must
also address the provider incentives—in our case, viability—
since providers offer the quality content needed for a thriv-
ing ecosystem. Each provider c has a viability threshold
νc over the amount of (possibly recency-weighted) user en-
gagement (e.g., visits, time spent) generated for it by the RS.
Periodically, c compares its overall engagement against νc
and abandons the platform—perhaps stochastically–if this
threshold is not reached (we detail specific forms of this
function below). If a provider becomes unviable, it can no
longer be matched by the RS to any user query.
2.2. Suboptimality of Myopic Policies
Before developing our methods, we use two simple exam-
ples to illustrate why typical myopic recommendation poli-
cies may be suboptimal.
Typical RSs behave myopically: when query qu is received,
it is matched to the provider giving maximum user reward
c∗qu = arg maxc∈C r(qu, c). In the example in Fig. 1(a),
each provider has a viability threshold of 2 and is viable in
the initial period. The myopic policy first matches each of
u1, u2, u3 to c1; u4, u5 to c2; and u6 to c3. This gives total
immediate reward 10 + 2ε according to the reward function
r(u, c) = 2− |u− c| for each recommendation. However,
since c3 receives only one user, it is no longer viable at
the next period. Hence, at all subsequent periods, the RS
must match u6 to c2 (with reward 0), attaining a long-run
per-period average reward of 8 + 2ε.
A non-myopic policy can obtain a long-run average reward
of 10− 2ε by matching u3 to c2 and u5 to c3 at each period.
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(b)
Figure 1. Two 1D examples: (a) User ui’s reward for being
matched to provider cj is 2 less the distance between them (e.g.,
u1 has reward 2 for c1; u3 has reward 1 + ε (resp., 1− ε) for c1
(resp., c2). We equate reward and utility, and a user with her query.
assume that each user issues a single query per period, and that
each provider requires 2 user impressions in each period to remain
viable at the next period. (b) Similar to (a) except that c1 requires
2 impressions and c2 requires 10.
Under this policy, c3 remains viable, allowing u6 to receive
reward 2 (rather than 0) in perpetuity. This comes at a
small price to u3 and u5, each of whom receive 2ε less per
period. This matching subsidizes c3 by matching its content
to u5 (who would slightly prefer provider c2). This subsidy
leaves c2 vulnerable, so it too is subsidized by the match
with u3. Indeed, this matching is optimal for any horizon
of at least two periods—its average-per-period user social
welfare (or total reward) is maximized. The maximum loss
of utility experienced by any user at any period w.r.t. the
myopic policy is quite small, only 2ε (by both u3, u5)—this
is the maximum (user) regret of the policy. Finally, this
policy keeps all providers viable in perpetuity; the set of
viable providers V = C is an equilibrium of the dynamical
system induced by the policy. By contrast, the myopic
policy reaches an equilibrium V ′ = {c1, c2} that has fewer
viable providers.
Consider now a policy that matches u3 to c3 at each period,
but otherwise behaves myopically. This induces the same
equilibrium V = C as the optimal policy by subsidizing
c3 with u3. However, this policy—though improving u5’s
utility by 2ε (and her regret to 0)—gives a reward of 0 to u3
(whose regret is 1 + ε). This policy not only has higher max
regret, it also has significantly lower welfare of 9 + ε.
While not the case in this example, the policy that optimizes
social welfare need not minimize max regret. Fig. 1(b) con-
siders a case where the viability threshold differs from each
of the two providers. The myopic policy initially matches
{u1, . . . , u3} to c1 and {u4, . . . , u12} to c2, after which c2
is no longer viable (and {u4, . . . , u12} receive no further
reward). Thus per-period reward is 5 + 4ε (and max regret
is ε.) The welfare-optimal policy subsidizes c2 by matching
u3, increasing welfare marginally by ε to 5 + 5ε, but also
increasing max regret (see u3) to 8ε. This illustrates the
trade-off between social welfare maximization and max-
regret minimization.
These examples show that maximizing user social welfare
often requires that the RS take action to ensure the long-run
viability of providers. The example from Fig 1(a) shows that
such considerations need not be explicit, but simply emerge
as a by-product of maximizing user welfare alone. This
also promotes diversity among viable providers that can in
some sense be interpreted as being “more fair” to the user
population. In particular, it creates a smaller gap between
the (long-term) utility values attained by different users
across the spectrum of possible topic interests. However, as
with provider diversity, this type of fairness is not part of
the explicit objective that drives the RS policy—rather it is
implicit, with fairness emerging as a consequence of trying
to maximize overall user welfare. We discuss connections to
work on ML fairness further below. For a richer illustration
of this, see Fig. 2.
2.3. Matching Optimization for Recommendation
We now formalize our objectives and optimization approach.
For ease of exposition, we assume an epoch-based decision
problem: time steps are grouped into epochs of fixed length
T , with user utility and provider viability both determined
at the end of each epoch. Let Q denote the induced distribu-
tion over queries during any epoch (since user behavior is
stationary, so is Q). Other forms of user/provider evaluation
do not impact the qualitative nature of our results—some
require different forms of analysis and optimization, while
others carry through easily. For example, if providers use
recency-weighted engagement, no substantial changes are
needed; but if their evaluation occurs on a continual (not
epoch-based) basis, more intricate equilibrium analysis is
required and optimization becomes more online in nature.
A policy pi induces a stochastic dynamical system over a
state space, where the state encodes user utility and provider
viability at the end of each epoch. Let random variable (RV)
epit (c) be provider c’s engagement at time t under pi, and
Epik (c) its cumulative engagement during epoch k ≥ 1. If
Epik (c) ≥ νc, c remains viable at epoch k + 1, otherwise it
abandons the platform. Let V pik be the set of providers that
are viable at the end of epoch k, We assume V pi0 = C.
Let (RV) rpik (u) be user u’s reward sequence in epoch
k under pi, and Upik (u) = f(r
pi
k (u)) be u’s util-
ity. Social welfare generated by pi at epoch k is
SW pik =
∑
u∈U U
pi
k (u). (Long-run) average social wel-
fare is SW pi∞ = limk→∞[
∑
k SW
pi
k ]/k. The average utility
Upi∞(u) of u under pi is defined analogously. If pi
∗
u is the pol-
icy that maximizes u’s average utility, then u’s regret under
pi is Rgrtpi(u) = Upi
∗
u∞ (u) − Upi∞(u). The maximum regret
of pi is MR(pi) = maxu∈U Rgrtpi(u). Let MC (u) ⊆ C be
those providers matched by the myopic policy to queries
Qu with positive support in Pu when all providers are vi-
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Figure 2. Recommendation using dynamics-informed constraints keeps more content providers viable in the long run, improving social
welfare amongst users. The first panel shows providers (blue triangles) and users (red dots) embedded in a 2D topic space. The second
and third panel respectively show equilibrium under Myopic and proposed linear program (LP) recommendation; here users whose
most-preferred provider has dropped out of the ecosystem are shaded in grey, while the remaining users are colored according to their
most-preferred provider.
able. Under the mild assumption that, for any u, there is
a policy that keeps MC (u) viable, Upi
∗
u∞ (u) = E[f(r∗(u))]
is a constant where r∗(u) is the realized reward sequence
when any qu generates reward arg maxc r(qu, c).
Our interest in long-run performance leads to a focus on
policy behavior in equilibrium w.r.t. provider viability. We
say V ⊆ C is an equilibrium of pi if, for some k ≥ 0,
V pik+j = V for all j ≥ 0 (i.e., the providers V pik that are
viable after epoch k remain viable in perpetuity). Since
most large-scale RSs have massive numbers of users, we
assume that the number of queries received at each point
in X (or within a suitable set of small subregions of X)
during each epoch is exactly its expectation. This can be
justified by appeal to the law of large numbers for epochs
of sufficient duration.2
Under these assumptions, we show that the recommenda-
tion policy that maximizes average social welfare has an
especially simple form. Specifically, there is an optimal
stationary policy (w.r.t. epochs) which can be formulated
as an optimal matching problem under viability constraints.
Consider the following single-epoch decision problem:
max
pi
∑
u∈U
E[f(rpi(u))|pi] (1)
s.t. piq,c > 0 only if
∑
u,qu
Q(qu)piqu,c ≥ νc, ∀ q, c (2)
Here pi is a vector of matching variables piqu,c, denoting
the proportion of queries qu to match to c.3 Q(qu) is the
2We discuss relaxations of this assumption below.
3This can also be interpreted as a stochastic policy, which is
the natural practical implementation. When user utility is time-
dependent, we sometimes allow the policy to be non-stationary
within the epoch, writing piqu,c,t for t ≤ T .
expected number of queries of the type qu, but note that
the method holds for any non-negative function of qu. The
expectation of u’s utility f is taken w.r.t. user activation at
each t in the epoch, the user query distribution and pi; i.e.,
the t-th component of rpi(u) is distributed as
rpit ∼ ρ(u)
∑
qu∈Q
Pu(qu)
∑
c
piqu,cr(qu, c). (3)
Objective (1) optimizes social welfare over the epoch, while
constraint (2) ensures that any matched provider remains
viable at the end of the epoch.
We show that applying this single-epoch policy pi across all
epochs is guaranteed to optimize average user social welfare.
Since the expectation Q(qu) is realized exactly, pi induces
an equilibrium during the first epoch. Moreover, the opti-
mization ensures it has maximum welfare, i.e., is the optimal
stationary policy. Finally, while a non-stationary pi′ may
initially improve welfare relative to pi, its equilibrium wel-
fare cannot exceed that of pi; so any welfare improvement
is transient and cannot increase (long-run) average welfare.
The stationary pi given by (1) anticipates the equilibrium
it induces and only matches to providers that are viable in
that equilibrium. This obviates the need to consider more
complex policies based on the underlying Markov decision
process (we discuss richer policy classes below).
3. Solving the Matching Optimization
We now develop several practical methods for solving the
optimization (1) to generate optimal policies. We consider
formulations that accommodate various forms of user utility:
simple linear, cumulative reward; a discounted model that
reflects decreasing marginal returns; and non-linear models
(of which sigmoidal utility is a motivating example). We
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then show how social welfare and regret can be traded off,
and briefly describe how the models can be made more
robust to uncertainty in the user query stream.
3.1. Additive Utility: A Linear Programming Model
We first develop a linear programming (LP) model that
applies when user utility is suitably additive, capturing both
cumulative reward and a discounted engagement model that
reflects a natural form of decreasing marginal return.
Let α ∈ RT+ be a vector of non-negative weights. We
assume linear user utility fα : r 7→
∑T
t=1 αtrt, where
user utility in an epoch is the α-weighted sum of immedi-
ate rewards (cumulative reward is a special case with all
αt = 1). Moreover, we consider a class of non-stationary
policies that take time itself as their only history feature,
piht,qu,c = pit,qu,c (if we allow pi to depend on arbitrary
statistics, the problem is a full POMDP).
The expected welfare of pi over the epoch is
∑
u
E[fα(rpi(u))|pi] =
T∑
t=1
∑
u∈U
∑
qu∈Q
∑
c∈C
αtpit,qu,cr¯(qu, c),
where r¯(qu, c) = ρ(u)Pu(qu)r(qu, c). Since (per-epoch)
social welfare SW pi is a linear function of pi, Eq. (1) can be
reformulated as a mixed-integer linear program (MILP):
max
pi, y
T∑
t=1
∑
u∈U
∑
qu∈Q
∑
c∈C
αtpit,qu,cr¯(qu, c)
s.t.
∑
c
piqu,c,t = 1 ∀t ∈ [1 : T ], qu ∈ Q,
piqu,c,t ≤ yc ∀t ∈ [1 : T ], qu ∈ Q, c ∈ C,∑
u,qu,t
Q(qu)piqu,c,t ≥ νcyc ∀c ∈ C
(4)
where matching variables pit,qu,c represent the stochastic
policy, and provider-viability variables yc are in {0, 1} (for
cumulative reward, dependence of pi on t can be removed).
Problem (4) is akin to max-utility constrained facility lo-
cation, where user-query-time tuples act as customers and
providers act as facilities. Related problems have been
investigated in various forms (An et al., 2017; Li, 2019; Cor-
nuejols et al., 1977). All variants (including ours) have basic
facility location as a special case (where the constraints are
trivial (i.e., νc = 0) and are thus NP-hard. Even though their
formulations are similar, each has different approximation
properties. The combination of objective and constraints we
consider has not, we believe, been studied in the literature.
Our problem can be approximated in polynomial time up to
a constant factor:
Theorem 1. Problem (4) can be approximated up to factor
1
e in polynomial time.
The core of the proof (see Appendix A.1) is to consider
the problem of computing maximum constrained welfare,
cSW (C), given a fixed set C ⊆ C of viable providers.
cSW (C) is the maximum of Eq. (4) when the provider
variables are “set” as yc = 1 iff c ∈ C; i.e., we find the
best stochastic matching given that all and only providers
in C remain viable. With the integer variables removed, the
problem becomes a polynomially sized LP. We show that
cSW is submodular in the provider set C, i.e., cSW (C ∪
{c′, c}) − cSW (C ∪ {c′}) ≤ cSW (C ∪ {c}) − cSW (C)
for any c, c′ ∈ C, c ⊂ C. This means that social welfare can
be approximately optimized by greedily adding providers
until no further viable providers can be added.
A more efficient alternative to greedy provider selection is
to directly round the results of the LP relaxation of Eq. (4).
This is known to yield good results for constrained facil-
ity location; we refer the interested reader to Jones (2015)
for a discussion of possible rounding strategies and the
implications on computational complexity. Beyond the
time savings, we find in preliminary experiments that the
LP-rounding heuristic performs indistinguishably from the
greedy method in terms of social welfare. Given its supe-
rior computational performance, we only evaluate the LP
rounding approach in our experiments (denoted LP-RS) in
Sec. 4.
The weighted linear utility model provides us with a mech-
anism for modeling decreasing marginal returns in user
utility, specifically, by discounting user rewards by setting
αt = γ
t−1 for some γ ∈ (0, 1]. Such discounting is one
simple way to model the realistic assumption of decreasing
marginal utility with increased content consumption (e.g., a
good match for a second user query has less impact on her
utility than it does for the first query). This model makes
it easier to maintain provider viability and improve social
welfare with lower individual regret (see Sec. 4).
3.2. Non-linear Utility: A Column Generation Model
While additive utility provides us with a useful model class
that can be solved approximately in polynomial time, it
cannot express important structures such as sigmoidal utility
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Optimal matching with such
non-linearities can be challenging.
Suppose now that f is nonlinear, e.g., f(rpi(u)) =
σ(rpi(u) + β). The facility location literature provides little
guidance for such problems. While approximation results
are known for concave problems (Hajiaghayi et al., 2003),
it is unclear if these apply with constraints, a setting that,
we believe, has not been investigated.
Our approach linearizes the problem to form a MILP that
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can subsequently be relaxed to an LP as follows. LetC ∈ Ck
be a k-tuple of providers. A pair
(qu, C) ∈ Q× Ck represents a possible answer to user u’s
k queries identical to qu by the provider tuple C. We call
such a tuple a star quC. For each star, we use a variable
piquC to represent the policy’s match to qu. The linearized
objective is then:
maximizepi,y
∑
u∈U
∑
qu∈Q
∑
C∈Ck
piquC σ¯(qu, C) , (5)
where σ¯(qu, C) = ρ(u)Pu(qu)σ(qu, C). The linear con-
straints from Eq. (4) are adapted to these stars. See Ap-
pendix A.2.1 for the complete optimization formulation and
our use of column generation to solve this much larger, more
complex problem.
3.3. Incorporating Regret Trade-offs
As discussed in Sec. 2.2, pure social welfare maxi-
mization can sometimes induce large maximum regret
(i.e., high regret for some users). Fortunately, max re-
gret can be traded off against social welfare directly
in the optimization. Let µu be a constant denoting
u’s maximum utility Upi
∗
u∞ (u) (see Sec. 2.3). Since the
term Upi(u) =
∑T
t=1
∑
qu∈Q
∑
c∈C piqu,c,tr¯(qu, c, t) de-
notes u’s expected utility in LP (4), we can express u’s
realized regret as a variable Rgrtuµu − Upi(u) for all
u ∈ U . Letting variable MR represent the max regret
induced by the policy, we can add the term −λMR to
the objective in MILPs (4) and (5) where constant λ con-
trols the desired welfare-regret trade-off. Constraining
MR ≥ Rgrtu,∀u ∈ U ensures MR takes on the actual max
regret induced by pi.
3.4. Extensions of the Model
Our matching optimization relies on some restrictive, un-
realistic assumptions about real-world RSs. However, our
stylized model directly informs approaches to more realistic
models (and can sometimes be adapted directly).
Robustness and RL: Strong assumptions about query dis-
tribution variance motivated our equilibrium arguments.
Even if these assumptions do not hold, our LP formulation
can be extended to generate “high-probability” optimal equi-
libria. For example, lower-confidence bounds on the traffic
expected for each provider under the induced policy can be
constructed, and viability thresholds inflated to allow for a
margin of safety. This can be encoded formally or heuristi-
cally within our LP model. A full RL approach offers more
flexibility by dynamically adjusting the queries matched to
a provider as a function of the state of all providers (e.g.,
exploiting query variance to opportunistically make addi-
tional providers viable, or “salvage” important providers
given, say, an unanticipated drop in traffic). The combi-
natorial nature of the state space (state of engagement of
each provider) complicates any RL model. Adaptive online
methods (e.g., as used in ad auctions (Mehta, 2013)) can
exploit optimization techniques like ours to dynamically
adjust the matching without the full complexity of RL.
Incomplete Information: Our model assumes complete
knowledge of both user utility and “interests” (via the query
distribution, the reward function and the utility function),
and of a provider’s position in “topic space” and its utility
(via its viability). In practice, these quantities are learned
from data and constantly updated, are generally never known
with full precision, and are often very uncertain. Indeed,
one reason “unfair” recommendations arise is when the RS
does not undertake sufficient exploration to discover diver-
sity in user interests (especially for niche users). Likewise
an RS is usually somewhat (though perhaps less) uncer-
tain of a provider’s content distribution. Incorporating this
uncertainty into our model can (a) generate more robust
matchings, and (b) drive exploration strategies that uncover
relevant user interests and utility given ecosystem viability
constraints. These extensions are an important direction for
future research.
Richer Dynamics: More complex dynamics exist in real
RS ecosystems than are captured by our simple model,
including: arrival/departure of providers/users; evolving
user interests and provider topics/quality; richer provider
responses (e.g., not just abandonment, but quality reduction,
content throttling, topic shifts); and strategic behavior by
providers. Our model serves only as a starting point for
richer explorations of these phenomena.
4. Experiments
We evaluate the effectiveness of our LP-rounding method
(Sec. 3.1), dubbed LP-RS, for additive utility models (we
consider both cumulative and discounted reward). Prelimi-
nary experiments show that LP-RS runs faster and performs
better than the greedy/submodular approach, so we do not
present results for the latter here. We provide a detailed eval-
uation of column generation for nonlinear models (Sec. 3.2)
in Appendix A.2.3. We compare the policy piLP based on
LP-RS to a myopic baseline policy piMy w.r.t. social welfare,
max regret and provider diversity/viability, assessing both
on several domains using a RS ecosystem simulator that
captures provider viability dynamics. We outline the sim-
ulator, describe our datasets and trained embeddings, then
discuss our findings.
4.1. Ecosystem
The ecosystem simulator captures the provider viability
dynamics described in Sec. 2.1. At each epoch, the RS
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observes a single query per user, and must serve a “slate”
of s providers to each user. A provider c can only occur
once in each slate (e.g., the myopic policy rank-orders the
s best-fit providers). The user query at each epoch is sam-
pled as qu[t] ∼ Pu[t](X); hence, the realized preference
changes at each epoch, but the distribution parameters are
fixed throughout the simulation. Providers are static and all
viability thresholds have the same value ν.
4.2. Datasets
Synthetic data To examine the emergent properties of
the ecosystem in a controlled setting, we generate synthetic
data in a two-dimensional topic space, like those in Fig. 2.
The query distribution is a mixture of Gaussians, with one
component for each provider centered at that provider’s
location in topic space X , and its weight reflecting the
user’s affinity for that provider’s topic area. We consider two
variants of the mixture model: (a) a uniform variant where
providers/topics are distributed uniformly, and all users have
the same variance; and (b) a skewed variant, where (w.l.o.g.)
topics near the origin are considered popular and receive
relatively more users, while topics far from the origin are
niche with fewer users, but whose users are more loyal and
exhibit lower variance. User-provider reward is given by
f(a, b) = −||a− b||2 (with max value 0).
Movie ratings We train an embedding on the Movielens
dataset (Harper & Konstan, 2015) using non-negative matrix
factorization on a sparse matrix of user-movie engagements
(see Appendix B for details). The pair of matrix factors are
then used as embedding vectors for users and providers for
the simulator (here each provider is a movie). User-provider
rewards are computed as r(qu, c) = qTu c.
Social network We train user and provider embeddings
from the SNAP 2010 Twitter follower dataset (Kwak et al.,
2010). This dataset consists of a large list of (followee,
follower) pairs, each with a unique account ID. We desig-
nate popular accounts as “providers,” and other accounts
as “users,” then learn a low-dimensional embedding that
captures affinity between users and providers via a link pre-
diction task (see Appendix B for details). User-provider
rewards are computed as r(qu, c) = qTu c.
4.3. Results
Exploring Embedding Type We begin by using synthet-
ically generated embeddings to study how properties of the
embeddings affect long-term social welfare under piMy. We
evaluate piLP and piMy using the uniform and skewed syn-
thetic embeddings. The results (Table 1) show that when
user/provider embeddings are skewed, myopic recommen-
dation yields suboptimal user welfare due to less popular
providers abandoning the platform. LP-RS improves wel-
Data Type Method Avg. Welfare Viable Providers
Uniform Myopic -2.41 ± 0.59 43.80 ± 1.94
LP-RS -1.23 ± 0.57 48.00 ± 2.10
Skewed Myopic -5.68 ± 0.61 34.40 ± 1.96
LP-RS -3.40 ± 1.10 42.00 ± 3.35
Table 1. (Synthetic data) Myopic recommendation performs
poorly when observing skewed user and provider embeddings
(some topic space areas are more popular). LP-RS improves social
welfare and number of viable providers for both data types. Note
that zero is the maximum possible welfare in this setting.
fare and increases the number of viable providers in both
cases. For the remainder of the paper we use only the
skewed variant of the synthetic data.
Tradeoffs in Regret and Welfare Next we investigate
the trade-off between social welfare and individual regret
induced by LP-RS at various levels of diminishing returns
for user utility, introduced by discounting immediate user
rewards as discussed in Sec 3.1. Recall that Rgrtpi(u) is
defined w.r.t. a policy pi∗u that is “tailor made” for user u,
one that keeps all providers with closest affinity to u viable
without regard to other users (and will generally serve most
users poorly). Under this definition, every policy will gener-
ally have very high max regret. But this serves as a useful
reference point for understanding how the preferences of
any single user trade off with long-term social welfare under
a realistic policy pi ∈ {piMy, piLP}. We discuss the results
for piLP in the following. Results for piMy can be found in
Appendix E.
We expect that steeper rates of diminishing returns (lower
γ) should lead to lower costs—that is, lower individual
regret, or sacrifice of individual utility—to generate the opti-
mal provider “subsidies” and generally induce more diverse
provider sets in equlibrium, which in turn leads to lower max
γ Avg. Welfare Max Regret Regret-Welfare Ratio Surviving Providers
0.1 18.02 ± 1.05 7.24 ± 0.77 0.40 ± 0.04 47.20 ± 1.72
0.18 19.79 ± 1.16 7.97 ± 0.84 0.40 ± 0.04 47.20 ± 1.72
0.26 21.87 ± 1.28 8.84 ± 0.91 0.41 ± 0.04 46.60 ± 2.15
0.35 24.30 ± 1.43 10.14 ± 1.18 0.42 ± 0.05 45.20 ± 3.06
0.43 27.17 ± 1.58 11.65 ± 0.91 0.43 ± 0.03 44.00 ± 3.16
0.51 30.44 ± 1.79 14.19 ± 1.46 0.47 ± 0.06 44.80 ± 0.98
0.59 34.30 ± 1.95 16.50 ± 1.73 0.48 ± 0.06 43.00 ± 1.90
0.67 38.67 ± 2.29 20.53 ± 1.46 0.53 ± 0.06 42.60 ± 1.50
0.75 43.69 ± 2.61 24.61 ± 1.31 0.57 ± 0.05 41.80 ± 1.72
0.84 49.51 ± 2.90 28.95 ± 1.11 0.59 ± 0.04 39.80 ± 3.06
0.92 56.15 ± 3.26 33.05 ± 1.16 0.59 ± 0.04 36.80 ± 3.97
1.0 63.62 ± 3.58 37.89 ± 1.39 0.60 ± 0.04 34.20 ± 5.08
Table 2. The trade-off between average user welfare and max user
regret depends on the discounting factor γ. The RS makes multiple
recommendations to each user during each epoch, and a lower γ
indicates more steeply discounted returns for recommendations
beyond the first one.
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(a) Synthetic data embeddings. (b) Movielens data embeddings. (c) SNAP data embeddings.
Figure 3. Average social welfare and number of viable providers per epoch of simulation. Bold lines are means over 5 seeds, while shaded
regions show 25-th to 75-th percentiles across runs.
regret. This makes our social welfare objective more aligned
with both provider and user fairness. Table 2 corroborates
this intuition, showing that better max-regret-to-average-
welfare ratios are generally achieved at low levels of γ, as
are a greater number of viable providers.
Large-scale Simulations We carry out large-scale simula-
tions using the dataset embeddings described in Section 4.2
(see Appendix C for details). Fig. 3 shows results from the
simulations, tracking both the number of viable providers
and average user utility (i.e., social welfare divided by num-
ber of users). We find that piLP quickly converges to an
equilibrium that sustains more providers than piMy. Average
user utility is also improved under piLP. Fig. 4 shows an
example user utility histogram (aggregated over the entire
simulation). LP-RS has an overall positive impact on the
Figure 4. User utility histogram (Synthetic embeddings). The LP
recommender improves average social welfare at the expense of
some maximum user regret.
distribution of user utility, relative to the myopic baseline.
However the increase in social welfare comes at the cost of
decreased utility for some of the most well-off users. See
Appendix D for utility histograms for all datasets.
5. Related Work
“Fairness” in outcomes for users and providers could be
described in a variety of (possibly conflicting) ways, and
any computational measurement of fairness in this context
will surely reflect normative principles underpinning the RS
design (Binns, 2018; Leben, 2020). We have presented a
utilitarian view whereby fair outcomes are realized when the
average welfare of users is maximized in equilibrium, with-
out taking other factors such as user/provider demographic
group membership or diversity of content into account ex-
plicitly. This is consistent with some recent approaches that
model long-term fairness by constraining the exploration
strategy of the decision maker (Joseph et al., 2016; Jabbari
et al., 2017) in the sense that fairness and optimality (here
w.r.t. expected user rewards) are aligned. However this
approach may not always be appropriate, so we note that the
general matching strategy we employ captures the dynamics
of the RS and could in principle be adapted to encourage
other types of “fair” outcomes in accordance with different
normative principles.
Studies of fairness in ranking typically consider notions
of group fairness, for example, by regularizing standard
ranking metrics to encourage parity of the ranks across
demographic groups (Yang & Stoyanovich, 2016; Zehlike
et al., 2017). Celis et al. (2017) propose a matching algo-
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rithm for ranking a set of items efficiently under a fairness
constraint that encourages demographic diversity of items
in the top-ranked position.
Research that considers fairness w.r.t. content providers
(rather than users), fairly allocating the exposure of
providers to users (Singh & Joachims, 2018; Biega et al.,
2018), is closely related to our work, especially in some
aspects of its motivation. These models impose fairness
constraints that address “provider” concerns, and maximize
user utility subject to these constraints. In this view, the pol-
icy makes commitments to every provider in the ecosystem,
while user welfare is secondary to satisfying the fairness
constraints. This requires that fairness constraints be crafted
very carefully (which is a non-trivial problem (Asudeh et al.,
2019)) so as to not have an undue impact on user welfare.
In our utilitarian framework, provider fairness is justified by
user welfare, implicitly incorporating fairness constraints.
Also very related to our work is the work of Ben-Porat &
Tennenholtz (2018), who develop a game-theoretic model of
RSs whose providers act strategically—by making available
or withholding content—to maximize the user engagement
derived from an RS platform. They analyze the policies of
the RS: using an axiomatic approach, they prove no RS pol-
icy can satisfy certain properties jointly (including a form
of fairness); and in a cooperative game model, they show
the uniqueness and tractability of a simple allocation pol-
icy. While related, their models are not dynamic and do
not (directly) assess complex user utility models; but they
examine more complex, strategic behavior of providers in a
way we do not. Ben-Porat et al. (2019) draw a connection
between (strategic) facility location games and RSs with
strategic providers. Our models relate to non-strategic fa-
cility location, with an emphasis on scalable optimization
methods.
Individual fairness provides an important alternative per-
spective, requiring that two individuals similar w.r.t. a task
should be classified (or otherwise treated) similarly by the
ML system (Dwork et al., 2012). Our utilitarian approach
guarantees that providers with sufficient impact on user wel-
fare remain viable, regardless of whether their audience lies
at the tail or head of content space. As shown in Sec. 4,
this provides a dramatic improvement over myopic poli-
cies which tend to serve “head” users and providers dis-
proportionately well. While maximizing welfare does not
guarantee high individual utility, we generally expect high
individual utility to emerge across the user population if util-
ity functions exhibit diminishing returns. If the form of user
utility precludes this, the objective can be augmented with a
maximum individual regret term as discussed in Sec 3.3.
Also relevant is recent research extending algorithmic fair-
ness to dynamical systems. Several methods for improved
fairness in sequential decision-making have been proposed,
including work on bandits (Joseph et al., 2016), RL (Jab-
bari et al., 2017), and importance sampling (Doroudi et al.,
2017). Fairness in dynamical systems has been explored in
specific domains: predictive policing (Lum & Isaac, 2016;
Ensign et al., 2018), hiring (Hu & Chen, 2018; Hu et al.,
2019), lending (Mouzannar et al., 2019), and RSs (Chaney
et al., 2018; Bountouridis et al., 2019). In general, this work
has focused on the role of algorithms in shaping environ-
ments over time (Hashimoto et al., 2018; Kannan et al.,
2019), observing that the repeated application of algorithms
in a changing environment impacts fairness in the long-term
differently from short-term effects.
6. Conclusion
We have developed a stylized model of the ecosystem dy-
namics of a content recommender system. We have used
it to study the effects of typical myopic RS policies on
content providers whose viability depends on attaining a
certain level of user engagement. We showed that myopic
policies can serve users poorly by driving the system to an
equilibrium in which many providers fail to remain viable,
inducing poor long-term (user) social welfare. By formulat-
ing the recommendation problem holistically as an optimal
constrained matching, these deficiencies can be overcome:
we optimize long-term social welfare, while at the same
time increasing provider viability despite the fact that our
objective is to increase user welfare. We developed sev-
eral algorithmic approaches to the matching problem and
experiments with our LP-based approach showed signifi-
cant improvements in user welfare over myopic policies.
While our model is stylized, we believe it offers insights
into more general, realistic RS model as outlined in Sec. 3.4.
It provides a rich framework for studying tradeoffs between
individual utility and (utilitarian) social welfare. Extensions
to account for group fairness, strategic behavior and explo-
ration policies are critical areas of future research as are new
algorithmic techniques (e.g., reinforcement learning, online
matching) as discussed in Sec.3.4.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Francois Belletti, Yi-fan Chen and Aranyak
Mehta for valuable discussions on this topic and to the
reviewers for their helpful suggestions.
References
An, H., Singh, M., and Svensson, O. LP-based algorithms
for capacitated facility location. SIAM Journal on Com-
puting, 46(1):272–306, 1 2017. ISSN 0097-5397. doi:
10.1137/151002320.
Asudeh, A., Jagadishy, H., Stoyanovichz, J., and Das, G.
Optimizing Long-term Social Welfare in Recommender Systems
Designing fair ranking schemes. ACM SIGMOD Record,
01 2019.
Barocas, S. and Selbst, A. D. Big data’s disparate impact.
California Law Review, 671, 2016.
Ben-Porat, O. and Tennenholtz, M. A game-theoretic ap-
proach to recommendation systems with strategic content
providers. In Advances in Neural Information Process-
ing Systems 31 (NeurIPS-18), pp. 1118–1128, Montreal,
2018.
Ben-Porat, O., Goren, G., Rosenberg, I., and Tennenholtz,
M. From recommendation systems to facility location
games. In Proceedings of the Thirty-third AAAI Confer-
ence on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-19), pp. 1772–1779,
Honolulu, 2019.
Beutel, A., Covington, P., Jain, S., Xu, C., Li, J., Gatto, V.,
and Chi, E. H. Latent cross: Making use of context in
recurrent recommender systems. In Proceedings of the
Eleventh ACM International Conference on Web Search
and Data Mining (WSDM-18), pp. 46–54, Marina Del
Rey, CA, 2018.
Beutel, A., Chen, J., Doshi, T., Qian, H., Wei, L., Wu, Y.,
Heldt, L., Zhao, Z., Hong, L., Chi, E. H., and Goodrow,
C. Fairness in recommendation ranking through pairwise
comparisons. In Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGKDD
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery &
Data Mining (KDD-19), pp. 2212–2220, Anchorage, AK,
2019.
Biega, A. J., Gummadi, K. P., and Weikum, G. Equity
of attention: Amortizing individual fairness in rankings.
In The 41st International ACM SIGIR Conference on
Research & Development in Information Retrieval, SIGIR
18, pp. 405414, New York, NY, USA, 2018. Association
for Computing Machinery.
Binns, R. Fairness in machine learning: Lessons from politi-
cal philosophy. In Conference on Fairness, Accountability
and Transparency, pp. 149–159, 2018.
Bountouridis, D., Harambam, J., Makhortykh, M., Marrero,
M., Tintarev, N., and Hauff, C. SIREN: A simulation
framework for understanding the effects of recommender
systems in online news environments. In Proceedings of
the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Trans-
parency, pp. 150–159. ACM, 2019.
Celis, L. E., Straszak, D., and Vishnoi, N. K. Ranking with
fairness constraints. In ICALP, 2017.
Celma, O`. The long tail in recommender systems. In Music
Recommendation and Discovery, pp. 87–107. Springer,
2010.
Chaney, A. J. B., Stewart, B. M., and Engelhardt, B. E.
How algorithmic confounding in recommendation sys-
tems increases homogeneity and decreases utility. In Pro-
ceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Recommender
Systems, RecSys 18, pp. 224232, New York, NY, USA,
2018. Association for Computing Machinery.
Chen, M., Beutel, A., Covington, P., Jain, S., Belletti, F., and
Chi, E. Top-k off-policy correction for a REINFORCE
recommender system. In 12th ACM International Con-
ference on Web Search and Data Mining (WSDM-19), pp.
456–464, Melbourne, Australia, 2018.
Cornuejols, G., Fisher, M. L., and Nemhauser, G. L. Lo-
cation of bank accounts to optimize float: An analytic
study of exact and approximate algorithms. Manage-
ment Science, 23(8):789–810, 1977. URL http://
www.jstor.org/stable/2630709.
Covington, P., Adams, J., and Sargin, E. Deep neural net-
works for YouTube recommendations. In Proceedings of
the 10th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp.
191–198, Boston, 2016.
Doroudi, S., Thomas, P. S., and Brunskill, E. Importance
sampling for fair policy selection. In Uncertainty in
Artificial Intelligence (UAI), 2017.
Dwork, C., Hardt, M., Pitassi, T., Reingold, O., and Zemel,
R. Fairness through awareness. In Proceedings of the
3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Confer-
ence, ITCS 12, pp. 214226. Association for Computing
Machinery, 2012.
Ensign, D., Friedler, S. A., Neville, S., Scheidegger, C.,
and Venkatasubramanian, S. Runaway feedback loops in
predictive policing. In Conference on Fairness, Account-
ability and Transparency, pp. 160–171, 2018.
Hajiaghayi, M. T., Mahdian, M., and Mirrokni, V. S. The
facility location problem with general cost functions. Net-
works, 42(1):42–47, 2003.
Harper, F. M. and Konstan, J. A. The Movielens datasets:
History and context. ACM Transactions on Interactive
Intelligent Systems, 5(4):1–19, 2015.
Hashimoto, T. B., Srivastava, M., Namkoong, H., and Liang,
P. Fairness without demographics in repeated loss mini-
mization. In International Conference on Machine Learn-
ing, 2018.
He, X., Liao, L., Zhang, H., Nie, L., Hu, X., and Chua, T.
Neural collaborative filtering. In Proceedings of the 26th
International Conference on World Wide Web (WWW-17),
pp. 173–182, Perth, Australia, 2017.
Optimizing Long-term Social Welfare in Recommender Systems
Hu, L. and Chen, Y. A short-term intervention for long-term
fairness in the labor market. In Proceedings of the 2018
World Wide Web Conference, pp. 1389–1398. Interna-
tional World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee,
2018.
Hu, L., Immorlica, N., and Vaughan, J. W. The disparate ef-
fects of strategic manipulation. In Proceedings of the Con-
ference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency,
pp. 259–268. ACM, 2019.
Hu, Y., Koren, Y., and Volinsky, C. Collaborative filtering
for implicit feedback datasets. In 2008 Eighth IEEE
International Conference on Data Mining, pp. 263–272.
Ieee, 2008.
Ie, E., Jain, V., Wang, J., Narvekar, S., Agarwal, R., Wu, R.,
Cheng, H.-T., Chandra, T., and Boutilier, C. SlateQ: A
tractable decomposition for reinforcement learning with
recommendation sets. In Proceedings of the Twenty-
eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial In-
telligence (IJCAI-19), pp. 2592–2599, Macau, 2019.
Jabbari, S., Joseph, M., Kearns, M., Morgenstern, J., and
Roth, A. Fairness in reinforcement learning. In Proceed-
ings of the 34th International Conference on Machine
Learning-Volume 70, pp. 1617–1626. JMLR.org, 2017.
Jacobson, K., Murali, V., Newett, E., Whitman, B., and
Yon, R. Music personalization at Spotify. In Proceedings
of the 10th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems
(RecSys16), pp. 373–373, Boston, Massachusetts, USA,
2016.
Jones, M. The maximum facility location problem. B.s. the-
sis, The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia, 2015.
Joseph, M., Kearns, M., Morgenstern, J. H., and Roth, A.
Fairness in learning: Classic and contextual bandits. In
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pp.
325–333, 2016.
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. Prospect theory: An analysis
of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2):263–292,
1979.
Kannan, S., Roth, A., and Ziani, J. Downstream effects of
affirmative action. In Proceedings of the Conference on
Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp. 240–248.
ACM, 2019.
Konstan, J. A., Miller, B. N., Maltz, D., Herlocker, J. L.,
Gordon, L. R., and Riedl, J. GroupLens: Applying col-
laborative filtering to usenet news. Communications of
the ACM, 40(3):77–87, 1997.
Kwak, H., Lee, C., Park, H., and Moon, S. What is Twitter,
a social network or a news media? In Proceedings of the
19th International Conference on World Wide Web, pp.
591–600, 2010.
Leben, D. Normative principles for evaluating fairness
in machine learning. In Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM
Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, AIES 20, pp.
8692, New York, NY, USA, 2020. Association for Com-
puting Machinery. ISBN 9781450371100. doi: 10.
1145/3375627.3375808. URL https://doi.org/
10.1145/3375627.3375808.
Li, S. On facility location with general lower bounds. In Pro-
ceedings of the Thirtieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium
on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 19, pp. 22792290, USA,
2019. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
Lum, K. and Isaac, W. To predict and serve? Significance,
13(5):14–19, 2016.
Mehta, A. Online matching and ad allocation. Foundations
and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, 8(4):265–
368, 2013.
Mouzannar, H., Ohannessian, M. I., and Srebro, N. From
fair decision making to social qquality. In Proceedings of
the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Trans-
parency, pp. 359–368. ACM, 2019.
Ribeiro, M. H., Ottoni, R., West, R., Almeida, V. A. F., and
Jr., W. M. Auditing radicalization pathways on YouTube.
In FAT* ’20: Conference on Fairness, Accountability,
and Transparency, pp. 131–141, Barcelona, 2020.
Salakhutdinov, R. and Mnih, A. Probabilistic matrix factor-
ization. In Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems 20 (NIPS-07), pp. 1257–1264, Vancouver, 2007.
Singh, A. and Joachims, T. Fairness of exposure in rankings.
In Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGKDD International
Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining,
KDD 18, pp. 22192228, New York, NY, USA, 2018.
Association for Computing Machinery.
Yang, K. and Stoyanovich, J. Measuring fairness in ranked
outputs. In SSDBM ’17, 2016.
Zehlike, M., Bonchi, F., Castillo, C., Hajian, S., Megahed,
M., and Baeza-Yates, R. Fa*ir: A fair top-k ranking algo-
rithm. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Conference
on Information and Knowledge Management, CIKM 17,
pp. 15691578, New York, NY, USA, 2017. Association
for Computing Machinery.
Optimizing Long-term Social Welfare in Recommender Systems
A. Algorithms and Proofs
A.1. Greedy Optimization and Theorem 2
A.1.1. PRELIMINARIES
Before we begin the proof, we make a few notational modifications to significantly simplify it. Let C be a set of content
providers (hereinafter providers), U a set of users, and A ∈ R|U|×|C| a utility matrix. Furthermore, let D : U → N be a user
demand function (specifying how many queries a user u submits to the system) and νc for c ∈ C be the provider survival
threshold, indicating how many queries the provider needs to receive in order to be viable. For this section, we will make the
following simplifying assumptions:
• every user has exactly one unique query during the epoch, and
• every user’s view contributes exactly one unit towards a provider’s viability.
Under these assumptions, the set of queries becomes identical to the set of users (U = Q), and Q¯(qu) = 1. We proceed to
prove the submodularity of user welfare as a function of the provider set subject to the above restrictions. After that, we
discuss the reduction of Problem 4 to this restricted case.
The fairness dynamics problem is then to find a matching such that
X∗ = arg max
X,Y
∑
u∈U
D(u)∑
t=1
∑
c∈C
AucXuct

subject to
∑
c∈C
Xuct = 1 ∀u ∈ U , t ∈ {1, . . . , D(u)}
Xuct ≤ Yc ∀u ∈ U , c ∈ C∑
u∈U
D(u)∑
t=1
Xuct ≥ νcYc, ∀c ∈ C
Xuct, Yc ∈ {0, 1}, ∀u ∈ U , c ∈ C, t ∈ [1, . . . , D(u)], (6)
The problem (6) is a hard combinatorial problem, so the question is if we can derive good heuristics for solving it. Of
particular interest is the following greedy heuristic: let C ⊆ C and define g : 2C → R as
g(C) 7→ max
X
∑
u∈U
D(u)∑
t=1
∑
c∈C
AucXuct

subject to
∑
c∈C
Xuct = 1 ∀u ∈ U , t ∈ [1, . . . , D(u)]
∑
u∈U
D(u)∑
t=1
Xuct ≥ νc ∀c ∈ C
Xuct ∈ {0, 1}, ∀u ∈ U , c ∈ C, t ∈ [1, . . . , D(u)]. (7)
That is, g(C) is the best matching if the provider set C ⊂ C is fixed externally. Despite that (7) has binary constraints on
Xuct, its constraint matrix is Totally Unimodular; hence, we are guaranteed that (7) is integral. The goal is then to start
with C = ∅ and greedily add providers while g(C) keeps improving. In order for this to work well, g would need to be
sub-modular, which is precisely what we prove next.
Theorem 2. For every two providers c0, c1 ∈ C and C ⊆ C \ {c0, c1}, it holds that
g(C ∪ {c0, c1})− g(C ∪ {c1}) ≤ g(C ∪ {c0})− g(C). (8)
Optimizing Long-term Social Welfare in Recommender Systems
A.1.2. PROOF OF THEOREM 2 IN THE UNIT CASE
Let us make a simplification: a user with D(u) queries is equivalent to D(u) independent users; thus, we will just work with
an extended user set. We now present the terminology used in this proof. A matching X : U → C, is a function from users to
providers. We denote by C(X) the serving providers under X , i.e., C(X) = {c | ∃u ∈ U , X(u) = c}. Further, we say that a
matching X is feasible if every provider in C(X) meets her threshold under X , namely, if for every c ∈ C(X) it holds that
|{u ∈ U | X(u) = c}| ≥ νc. We denote by F (X) the value obtained for a feasible matching X in Problem (7) (note that X
may not be optimal w.r.t.. C(X)). In the rest of the proof, we rely on optimal matchings for C,C ∪ {c1} and C ∪ {c0, c1} to
construct a new matching, X0. The active providers under X0 are C ∪ {c0} and, as we shall show, X0 satisfies
g(C ∪ {c0, c1})− g(C ∪ {c1}) ≤ F (X0)− g(C). (9)
The latter immediately implies Inequality (8), since by definition of g,
F (C ∪ {c0, c1}) ≤ max
X:C(X)=C∪{c0}
F (X) = g(C ∪ {c0}).
We are now ready to develop the tools required for the proof. The next notion assists to succinctly quantify the difference in
user utility between two matchings.
Definition 1. Let X be and Y be two feasible matchings. We call a triplet (c, c′, u) a relocation triplet w.r.t. X,Y if
X(u) = c, Y (u) = c′ and c 6= c′.
Importantly, two matchings define a unique set of (ordered) relocation triplets. conversely, a source matching and relocation
triplets uniquely define the target matching.
Let X and X1 denote (any) optimal matching induced by g(C) and g(C ∪ {c1}) in Problem (7), respectively. We now
construct a graph whose nodes are the providers and its edges correspond to relocation triplets w.r.t. X,X1. Formally, let
G1 = (C, E1, w) denote a directed multi-graph, where the set of nodes is C; E1 is the set of all relocation triplets w.r.t.
X,X1, where every triplet (c, c′, u) forms a directed edge from c = X(u) to c′ = X1(u) with an ID of u; and the weight
function w is defined by w(c, c′, u) = Auc′ −Auc. Observe that the number of users each provider c (a node in the graph)
obtains under X1 equals
|{u ∈ U | X(u) = c}|+ deg+(c)− deg−(c), (10)
where deg+(c) denotes the indegree of c and its outdegree is denoted by deg−(c). Moreover, the sum of weights is precisely
the difference in utility between X and X1, i.e.,
F (X1)− F (X) = g(C ∪ {c1})− g(C) =
∑
e∈E1
w(e).
In the next proposition, we use the fact that X,X1 are optimal w.r.t. their provider sets to characterize properties of G1.
Proposition 1. It holds that:
(1) G1 does not contain directed cycles.
(2) The only sink in G1 is c1.
The proof of Proposition 1 appears below. Proposition 1 suggests that G1 is a DAG with flow conservation, so we can
decompose its edges into a set of independent paths (for any arbitrary partition into paths) between a source, i.e. a provider
with an excess of users under the matching X , and the sink c1.
Next, we introduce a second graph, G0,1, with relocation triplets from X1 to X0,1, the optimal matching for g(C ∪{c0, c1}).
Formally, G0,1 = (C, E0,1, w) is a directed multi-graph, with the same set of nodes and the same weight function w. E0,1 is
composed of all relocation triplets fromX1 toX0,1. By mirroring the proof of Proposition 1, we conclude thatG0,1 contains
no cycles and that c0 is the unique sink of every directed path in it. This graph is of special interest because its sum of weights
is the left hand side of Inequality (8). Namely,
∑
e∈E0,1 w(e) = F (X
0,1)− F (X1) = g(C ∪ {c0, c1})− g(C ∪ {c1}). It
also describes how to optimally relocate users from C ∪ {c1} to C ∪ {c0, c1}.
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After understanding the structural properties of G1 and G0,1, we are ready to construct the promised matching X0 (recall
Inequality (9)). Let G = (C, E1 ∪ E0,1, w) be the graph on the same set of nodes C, with all the edges from both E1 and
E0,1 (notice that the same edge cannot appear in both). For simplicity, we refer to paths in E1 as blue and to paths in E0,1
as red, for some arbitrary partition into paths. Our goal is to select a subset E of edges from E1 ∪E0,1, which, when applied
to X , will induce the matching X0. To that end, we devise an iterative process to construct the set E, by adding one path at
the time. The key property of this process, which we formalize via Algorithm 1, is that there exists a mapping from every
red path to a new path, composed of red and (potentially) blue edges, with a less or equal weight than that red path.
To illustrate why this process is necessary, observe that not every subset of E1 ∪E0,1 can be applied to X in order to obtain
a new valid matching. In particular, recall that E0,1 is the difference between X1 and X0,1; thus, a red path may involve the
relocation (c, c′, u), where u might have been matched to c′ due some blue relocation (c′′, c, u). To ensure that the subset
we pick will result in a valid matching, we make the following distinction: a subset E such that E ⊆ E1 ∪ E0,1 is called
consistent if for any relocation triplet (c, c′, u) ∈ E either X(u) = c or there exists another relocation triplet (c′′, c, u) ∈ E.
Informally, E is consistent if every user u that was relocated to c′ from c was either matched to c in X , or was relocated to c
from another provider. Consistency of the relocation triplets is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the resulting
matching to be feasible.
Another useful notion is that of a junction node. We say that a node c ∈ C is a junction w.r.t. E1, E0,1 if there exists a blue
edge (c′′, c, u) ∈ E1 and a red edge (c, c′, u) ∈ E0,1 for some c′, c′′ ∈ C and u ∈ U . See Fig. 5 for illustration.
Figure 5. Exemplifying the definition of a junction node. In (a), the node c is a junction between the red path that starts at cr (and ends at
c0) and the blue path that starts at cb (and ends at c1). The reason is that it receives the user u from c′′ along a blue edge, and passes u
along a red edge. In (b), however, c is not a junction, since the user it passes onward along the red path is u′, which is not the user c
receives along the blue path.
Next, we employ Algorithm 1 on the blue and red paths in E1 ∪ E0,1. We show that
Lemma 1. The output E of Algorithm 1 satisfies the following:
1. E is consistent.
2. When applied to X , the resulting matching X0 is feasible.
3.
∑
e∈E w(e) ≥
∑
e∈E0,1 w(e).
The proof of Lemma 1 appears below. As elaborated above, the matching X and the relocation triplets in E uniquely define
the matching X0. By the second part of Lemma 1, X0 is feasible. Moreover, by the third part of Lemma 1 and the definition
of relocation triplets, we have
g(C ∪ {c0, c1})− g(C ∪ {c1}) =
∑
e∈E0,1
w(e) ≤
∑
e∈E
w(e) = F (X0)− g(X).
This completes the proof of the theorem.
A.1.3. PROOFS OF PROPOSITION 1 AND LEMMA 1
Proof of Proposition 1. For (1), assume by contradiction that a simple cycle e1, e2, . . . ek exists for some k ∈ N. Since
c1 /∈ C(X), there is no relocation triplet with c1 in the first entry, and hence c1 does not participate in the cycle. We proceed
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Algorithm 1 Flow Construction for X0
1: let B be the set of blue paths and R be the set of red paths.
2: let E ← ∅ be the set of new paths.
3: while R 6= ∅ do
4: if there is a junction node w.r.t. B,R then
5: let c be a junction node, and b, r denote the paths whose edges (c′′, c, u) ∈ b, (c, c′, u) ∈ r form the junction such
that c is the closest junction node to the sink of b.
6: add to E the edge (c′′, c, u) and all the directed edges that precede it in b, and (c, c′, u) and all subsequent directed
edges in r.
7: remove r from R, b from B.
8: continue
9: else
10: add all the edges in R to E, set R← ∅.
11: end if
12: end while
13: return E
by analyzing the weight of the cycle,
∑k
i=1 w(ei).
4
• If∑ki=1 w(ei) = 0, we can remove the cycle from the graph and obtain a new graph G˜1 and a corresponding matching
X˜1. Observe that the number of users every provider gets is the same as in X (see Equation (10)), and hence not only
C(X˜1) = C(X1) = C ∪ {c1} but also every provider in that set meets her threshold. Further, we did not change the
sum of weights, and F (X1)− F (X) = F (X˜1)− F (X) implies F (X1) = F (X˜1); hence, X˜1 is also optimal and we
can assume w.l.o.g. that X1 does not contain such cycles.
• If∑ki=1 w(ei) > 0, we denote by X˜ a matching such that
X˜(u) =
{
c′ if the edge (c, c′, u) belongs to the cycle
X(u) otherwise
.
Since the number of users each provider in C = C(X) = C(X˜) gets under X˜ is the same as under X , X˜ is feasible.
Moreover, F (X˜)− F (X) > 0; hence, we obtain a contradiction to the optimality of X .
• If∑ki=1 w(ei) < 0, we can use an argument similar to the previous case to claim sub-optimality of X1.
For (2), assume by contradiction that a node v ∈ C, v 6= c1 is a sink, and observe that we must have v ∈ C since
C(X1) = C ∪ {c1}. Let v1, . . . , vk, v denote the shortest path ending at v. Because c1 /∈ C(X), we know that c1 cannot
participate in this path. Further, X is feasible and hence v gets at least νv users under X1. The analysis identically to the
first part of the proposition, arguing that the contradiction assumption entails the existence of a path with positive/negative
weights, in contrast to the optimality of X and X1.
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume by contradiction that the output E is not consistent. By definition of consistency, there exists an
edge e = (c, c′, u) such that
1. X(u) 6= c, and
2. (c′′, c′, u) /∈ E for every c ∈ C.
Notice that e ∈ E ⊆ E1 ∪ E0,1; hence, e is either blue or red. If e is blue, let b(e) denote the path e is part of. Since e ∈ E
and is blue, the only way it could have been added to E is via Line 1. This means that either e is the first edge in b(e), in
4In general, a set of relocation triplets can contain cycles with positive/negative weights, if providers pass different users along the
cycle. However, as we prove, this cannot happen in G1 due to the optimality of X1.
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which case X(u) = c since E1 is consistent; or e is an intermediate edge in b(e), in which case there exists another edge
e′ = (c′′, c′, u) ∈ b(e) that precedes it, again because E1 is consistent. In both cases, we obtain contradiction.
Otherwise e is red. Let r denote the path that contains e. We have two cases:
• If c is a junction w.r.t. the initial B,R. In this case, there exists a blue path b ∈ B that contains an edge (c′′, c, u), by
the definition of a junction node. Moreover, at some point in the execution e was added, so b must have been identified
as a path containing an edge that forms a junction node v (not necessarily c) in Line 1. Recall that in Line 1 we assume
that v is the closest junction node to the sink of b, which is c1; hence, all edges of b that precedes the outgoing edge
from v are added to E too, including (c′′, c, u). This implies a contradiction.
• Else, c is not a junction. If e is the first edge in the red path r, then X1(u) = c, and since c is not a junction, X(u) = c
as well. This holds because both X,X1 are feasible. Otherwise, if e is an intermediate edge in r, then there must exists
a red edge (c′′, c, u) for some c′′ ∈ C, because E1 ∪ E0,1 is consistent. Since red edges like e are inserted to E in
Lines 1 and 1, the preceding edges in their red path, including (c′′, c, u), are added as well. In both cases, we reach a
contradiction.
Second part Denote the matching obtained by applying the relocation triplets of E to X by X0. To show that X0 is
feasible, we need to show that for every c ∈ C ∪ {c0}, it holds that
∣∣{u : X0(u) = c}∣∣ ≥ νc. To do so, we rely on the
feasibility of X1 and X1,0, whose relocation edges were used to construct X0. We divide the analysis into three parts:
• If c = c0. Since X1,0 is feasible, we know that the deg+(c0) in G0,1 is at least νc0 (Recall the quantification of the
number of matched users in Equation (10)). Since E contains the final edge of every red path, the indegree of c0 in
G0 = (C, E, w) is the same as in G0,1.
• Else, if c is the source of at least one path in E. In this case, it must have been the source of some paths in E1 (blue) and
E0, 1 (red). Recall that the sink of every blue path is c1, and the sink of every red path is c0. Moreover, if c participates
in other red/blue paths, it must be an intermediate node; thus, we can analyze its loss of users due to the paths in which
c is the source solely. Since E ⊆ E1 ∪E0,1, c is the source of less paths in G0 = (C, E, w) than in G0,1; therefore, its
indegree in G0 is greater or equal to its indegree in G0,1, which implies that X0 matched c with at least as many users
as X0,1.
• Finally, for any other c, X0 matches c with the same number of users as X0,1, since its difference between the indegree
and the outdegree in G0 = (C, E, w) remains as in G0,1.
Third part The proof of this part is based on the following observation:
Observation 1. Let b be a blue path with source cb and sink c1, r be a red path with source cr and sink c0, and let c be
a junction w.r.t. b and r, with edges (c′′, c, u) ∈ b and (c, c′, u) ∈ r. Denote by p the path that starts from cb, takes the
edge (c′′, c, u) and the edges that precedes in b, and then takes (c, c′, u) and its subsequent edges in r, ending at c0. Then,∑
e∈p w(e) ≤
∑
e∈E0,1 w(e).
To see why Observation 1 holds, recall that the prefix of p from its source to (c′′, c, u) inclusive, all blue edges, must have
higher weight than the prefix of r from its source to (c, c′, u), exclusive. This is true since otherwise we could find a heavier
blue path to replace b in E0. However, this cannot be true as X1, which accounts for the blue edges in G1, is an optimal
matching for g(C ∪ {c1}). Finally, Algorithm 1 adds red paths either in their entirety (Line 1) or by modifying them to be
heavier according to Observation 1; hence,
∑
e∈E w(e) ≥
∑
e∈E0,1 w(e).
To complete the picture, it remains to argue that problems in which user queries contribute non-unit amounts to provider
viability can be reduced to the unit case analyzed in the previous sections. That is, constraints of the type
∑
u∈U wucXuc ≥
νcYc, where the weights w are non-negative rational numbers, can be converted into constraints of the type
∑
u∈U Xuc ≥
νcYc. Assuming that the weights are rational numbers, the linear program can be replaced with an equivalent one with
integer coefficients, that is, wuc are integer. Each of these integer counts then can be replaced by a fictional user that
contributes a unitary count towards the provider’s viability.
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A.2. Non-linear Optimization via Column Generation
A.2.1. FORMULATION
As discussed in Sec. 3.2, it is desirable to have a procedure that can optimize social welfare under non-linear utility models.
To this end, we extend the mixed-integer linear program in Problem (4) to handle non-linear utilities. Let C ∈ Ck be a
k-tuple of providers. A pair (qu, C) ∈ Q × Ck represents a possible answer to user u’s k queries identical to qu by the
provider tuple C. We call such a tuple a star quC. For each star, we use a variable piquC to represent the policy’s match to
qu.
max
pi, y
∑
u∈U
∑
qu∈Q
∑
C∈Ck
piqu,C σ¯(qu, C)
s.t.
∑
C∈Ck
piqu,C ≤ 1 u ∈ U ,∑
{C∈Ck|c∈C}
piqu,C ≤ yc u ∈ U , c ∈ C,∑
u∈U
∑
C∈Ck
#[quC, c]Q(qu)piqu,C ≥ νcyc, c ∈ C,
(11)
where #[uC, c] is the number of times provider c appears in star quC, and σ¯(qu, C) = ρ(u)Pu(qu)σ(qu, C). We rely on
the linear relaxation of the integrality constraints to approximate the solution of (11) efficiently. It is not obvious if and how
this problem can be approximated via discrete algorithmic techniques, so we resort to relaxing the integrality constraints and
solving the problem as a linear program. Even under the linear relaxation, the problem size still grows proportionally to Ck
due to the number of variables introduced by linearization. The redeeming property of this problem, however, is that the
number of constraints grows proportionally to U ×Q× C and not Ck. Hence, it is feasible to approach the problem from a
column generation perspective.
A.2.2. COLUMN GENERATION
A standard column generation approach for solving a large linear program is a two-step iterative algorithm in which the LP
is initially constructed using a small subset of its variables to obtained a reduced-size (master) problem. The dual of the
master problem is solved to obtain a dual optimal solution, which is then used to find a (as of yet not generated) variable
with maximal reduced cost. That variable is added to the master problem. The method iterates until no variable with positive
reduced cost can be found, or some convergence tolerance is reached.
When the set of primal variables is large, the problem of finding a variable with maximal reduced cost (also called a column
generation oracle) is still a hard combinatorial optimization problem (typically some flavor of knapsack). However, these
problems tend to be massively decomposable so the running time does not scale exponentially in practice.
We now proceed to derive a column generation oracle for Problem (11). Let A = (A, b, c) denote an LP in inequality
form, denoting the optimization problem x∗ = arg maxx:Ax≤b,x≥0 cTx. Let y∗ be an optimal dual solution to A. The
reduced cost problem is thus cˆ = c−AT y∗. The column generation oracle thus solves the problem i∗ = arg maxi cˆ, which
corresponds to the index of the primal variable with highest reduced cost. We now discuss solving the column generation
problem given the specific form of (11).
We adopt the following convention for naming the dual variables corresponding to constraints in (11):
βu :
∑
C∈Ck
piqu,C ≤ 1 u ∈ U ,
γuc :
∑
{C∈Ck|c∈C}
piqu,C ≤ yc u ∈ U , c ∈ C,
αc :
∑
u∈U
∑
C∈Ck
#[quC, c]Q(qu)piqu,C ≥ νcyc c ∈ C.
The column generation problem (derived by computing the dual and maximizing the reduced cost) then becomes:
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Figure 6. Simulations that evaluate the column generation matching strategy (LP-RS col. gen.) on smaller problems. While LP-RS col.
gen. is capable of finding a good matching at a given step of simulation, its solutions are relatively inconsistent compared with LP-RS in
the limit of several time steps.
uC∗ = arg max
u∈U,C∈Ck
σ¯(qu, C)−
(
βu +
∑
c∈C
γuc −
∑
c∈C
#[quC, c]Q(qu)αc
)
.
Let us now discuss how the above maximization can be solved. First, observe that the problem decomposes in the user
variable u. That is for each u ∈ U , we can independently solve the maximization over C. This can be done in parallel for
each user and the maximum over u can be computed by enumeration. Supposing u is fixed, we still have to solve a series of
non-linear integer optimization problems due to the non-linear nature of σ¯. We can covert the non-linear problems to linear
in two steps. First, we convert the tuple maximization problem to a binary-variable one as by introducing slot indicator
variables for each of the elements of the tuple C. That is:
max
x
σ¯
(∑
t∈1:k
∑
c
xctAuc
)
−
(
βu +
∑
t∈1:k
∑
c∈C
xctγuc −
∑
c∈C
(∑
t
xct
)
αc
)
s.t.
∑
c
xct = 1 ∀t ∈ 1 : k .
max
x
σ¯′(mi) ·
(∑
t∈1:k
∑
c
xctAuc
)
−
(
βu +
∑
t∈1:k
∑
c∈C
xctγuc −
∑
c∈C
(∑
t
xct
)
αc
)
s.t.
∑
c
xct = 1 ∀t ∈ 1 : k , li ≤
∑
t∈1:k
∑
c
xctAuc ≤ ui,
where σ¯′(mi) is the derivative of σ¯ at mi. Under smoothness assumptions on σ¯, this linearization provides a bounded
approximation to the original problem. Again, these interval sub-problems can be solved in parallel.
A.2.3. ILLUSTRATIVE EVALUATION OF COLUMN GENERATION
Here we describe some preliminary experiments using the column generation strategy described above. We find that column
generation is capable of keeping more providers viable than the myopic baseline at early steps. However the performance
was less reliable than the LP-RS approach that was evaluated in Section 4. In some settings, the column generation approach
fails to maintain a consistent matching in successive iterations, resulting in a slowly declining number of viable providers
over time. We hypothesize that this is due to rounding errors in the procedure, or early stopping before convergence (our
implementation used 300 iterations of column generation rather than running exhaustively until convergence). Therefore we
expect that improvements can be made by fine-tuning this approach, but leave this to future work.
Figure 6 shows the results of the experiments. While we use the same embeddings data as in the main body of the paper, but
we scale down the problem size to compensate for the slower runtime of the column generation approach; this explains the
differing number of viable providers at equilibrium compared with the LP −RS approach presented in Section 4. In the
synthetic setting we used 50 providers, about 260 users and viability threshold of ν = 5. In the other two datasets we used a
competitive (from the provider perspective) setting of 100 providers, 100 users, and viability threshold of ν = 8. We used
slate size of 1 for all datasets.
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B. Training Details
Here we provide details of training for the embeddings described in Section 4.2.
Movielens We trained a non-negative matrix factorization embedding space using the Movielens dataset (Harper &
Konstan, 2015). We use the distribution of this dataset containing about 100, 000 ratings of about 9, 000 movies by about
600 users. The dataset comprises a sparse ratings matrix Given the sparse ratings matrix R ∈ RNusers×Nmovies≥0 . We use the
binarized engagement matrix E ∈ {0, 1}Nusers×Nproviders with Ei,j = 1(Ri,j). The embeddings are produced by finding
low-rank non-negative factors of the engagement matrix E ∈ {0, 1}Nusers×Nproviders , by solving the optimization problem
min
U,V
||(E − UV T )||2F + λU ||U ||2F + λV ||V ||2F (12)
which yields factors U ∈ RNusers×Ntopic≥0 and U ∈ RNproviders×Ntopic≥0 .
The factors U ∈ RNusers×Ntopic≥0 and C ∈ RNproviders×Ntopic≥0 yield row and column vectors that are treated as the embedding
vectors; in this case, a single content provider is equivalent to a single movie from the dataset.
The rows of these factor matrices were used to sample user and provider vectors in the RS ecosystem. Note that the value of
the ratings were not used, so the “affinity” between user and movie in this embedding space is a measure of how likely the
user is to watch the movie, rather than rate it highly. The randomly initialized factors U, V are alternatively updated via
Weighted alternating least squares (Hu et al., 2008) for 100 iterations. We used embedding rank Ntopic = 20, and set λU = 1
and λv = 1..
SNAP The dataset consists of a large list of (followee, follower) pairs, where each user is given a unique node ID label.
We turn this dataset into a set of providers and users as follows. First, we randomly subsample 100k of the 41 million users.
We designate followees as providers. For every provider, we then remove their follow edges, so that they do not follow
anyone else. This makes the graph bipartite, where users follow providers. We then choose the top 500 providers in terms
of follower count, and remove any users that do not follow at least one of them. This leaves a total of 500 providers, and
59,394 users.
for each user i, we learn a 24-dimensional vector ui, and for each provider j, a 24-dimensional vector vj . We train these
embeddings by cross-entropy to predict whether there is an edge Aij between user i and provider j, where the probability is
given by,
P (Aij = 1) = σ(u
>
i vj) (13)
Where σ(·) is the sigmoid function. Aij is 1 if user i follows provider j. We add a small amount of weight decay to ensure
that the embeddings are well behaved.
C. Simulation Details
This section contains details to reproduce the simulations described in Section 4.3.
Exploring Embedding Type We generate 50 provider vectors and a varying number of user vectors (between 4412 and
4672 per run). Provider and user vectors are sampled in a 10-dimensional topic space, with provider vectors sampled
normally with variance 50. These provider vectors serve as cluster means for the mixture-of-Gaussians that generates user
vectors. The prior over cluster assignments depends on the variant (uniform vs. skewed described in the text). User variance
was set to 0.1 in the uniform variant, and user variance scaled inversely with popularity in the skewed variant. The slate size
was s = 1, with viability threshold set to ν = 80. We run for 10 epochs using 5 seeds for each method/data type pair, and
report average values plus or minus one standard deviation in Table 1.
Tradeoffs in regret and welfare We generate synthetic embeddings of the skewed variant, with 50 providers and around
900 users. We use slate size s = 4 with viability threshold ν = 9. Other settings are carried over from the previous
experiment. We run steps of simulation until the policies converge then measure the welfare and max regret metrics.
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Figure 7. Histogram of user utility.
Synthetic simulation We generate synthetic embeddings of the skewed. The parameters are similar to those described
above, with 50 providers (distributed normally with σ2 = 5) and about 10, 000 users. We simulate the RS for ten epochs
with slate size s = 1 and viability threshold ν = 78.5.
Movielens simulation Starting with the learned low-rank factors, we subsample 250 movie column (which serve as
providers) and 1, 000 user columns. We simulate the RS for ten epochs with slate size s = 1 and viability threshold ν = 10.
SNAP simulation Starting with the learned embedding, we subsample 300 providers and 566 users. We simulate the RS
for ten epochs with slate size s = 1 and viability threshold ν = 10.
D. Additional Histograms
Figure 7 shows user utility histograms for all simulations.
E. Extended Welfare-Regret Tradeoff Results
Table 3 extends the result from Table 2 by including the Myopic baseline recommender.
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Avg. Welfare Max Regret Viable Providers
0.1 LP-RS 18.02 ± 1.05 7.24 ± 0.77 47.20 ± 1.72
Myopic 13.49 ± 1.26 10.17 ± 0.20 11.80 ± 1.47
0.18 LP-RS 19.79 ± 1.16 7.97 ± 0.84 47.20 ± 1.72
Myopic 14.83 ± 1.39 11.18 ± 0.22 11.80 ± 1.47
0.26 LP-RS 21.87 ± 1.28 8.84 ± 0.91 46.60 ± 2.15
Myopic 16.42 ± 1.54 12.37 ± 0.25 11.80 ± 1.47
0.35 LP-RS 24.30 ± 1.43 10.14 ± 1.18 45.20 ± 3.06
Myopic 18.29 ± 1.71 13.79 ± 0.27 11.80 ± 1.47
0.43 LP-RS 27.17 ± 1.58 11.65 ± 0.91 44.00 ± 3.16
Myopic 20.50 ± 1.92 15.45 ± 0.31 11.80 ± 1.47
0.51 LP-RS 30.44 ± 1.79 14.19 ± 1.46 44.80 ± 0.98
Myopic 23.08 ± 2.16 17.40 ± 0.35 11.80 ± 1.47
0.59 LP-RS 34.30 ± 1.95 16.50 ± 1.73 43.00 ± 1.90
Myopic 26.07 ± 2.44 19.65 ± 0.39 11.80 ± 1.47
0.67 LP-RS 38.67 ± 2.29 20.53 ± 1.46 42.60 ± 1.50
Myopic 29.51 ± 2.76 22.24 ± 0.44 11.80 ± 1.47
0.75 LP-RS 43.69 ± 2.61 24.61 ± 1.31 41.80 ± 1.72
Myopic 33.44 ± 3.13 25.21 ± 0.50 11.80 ± 1.47
0.84 LP-RS 49.51 ± 2.90 28.95 ± 1.11 39.80 ± 3.06
Myopic 37.91 ± 3.55 28.57 ± 0.57 11.80 ± 1.47
0.92 LP-RS 56.15 ± 3.26 33.05 ± 1.16 36.80 ± 3.97
Myopic 42.94 ± 4.02 32.36 ± 0.64 11.80 ± 1.47
1.0 LP-RS 63.62 ± 3.58 37.89 ± 1.39 34.20 ± 5.08
Myopic 48.59 ± 4.55 36.62 ± 0.73 11.80 ± 1.47
Table 3. The discounting factor γ allows LP-RS to trade off between average user welfare and max user regret.
